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Abstract. In recent publications, we presented a novel formal symbolic process virtual machine (FSPVM) framework that combined 
higher-order theorem proving and symbolic execution for verifying the reliability and security of smart contracts developed in the Ethereum 
blockchain system without suffering the standard issues surrounding reusability, consistency, and automation. A specific FSPVM, denoted as 
FSPVM-E, was developed in Coq based on a general, extensible, and reusable formal memory (GERM) framework, an extensible and universal 
formal intermediate programming language, denoted as Lolisa, which is a large subset of the Solidity programming language that uses 
generalized algebraic datatypes, and a corresponding formally verified interpreter for Lolisa, denoted as FEther, which serves as a crucial 
component of FSPVM-E. However, our past work has demonstrated that the execution efficiency of the standard development of FEther is 
extremely low. As a result, FSPVM-E fails to achieve its expected verification effect. The present work addresses this issue by first identifying 
three root causes of the low execution efficiency of formal interpreters. We then build abstract models of these causes, and present respective 
optimization schemes for rectifying the identified conditions. Finally, we apply these optimization schemes to FEther, and demonstrate that its 
execution efficiency has been improved significantly. 
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1. Introduction 
Blockchain technology [1], such as the Ethereum blockchain system, has been adopted in a wide variety of applications such as 
cryptocurrency [2] and distributed storage [3]. Among the most widely adopted blockchain systems, Ethereum implements a general-purpose 
Turing-complete programming language denoted as Solidity [4]. Solidity allows for the development of arbitrary applications and scripts (i.e., 
programs) that are collectively denoted as smart contracts, which can be executed in a virtual runtime environment denoted as the Ethereum 
Virtual Machine (EVM) to conduct blockchain transactions automatically. In addition to smart contracts, a number of other lightweight programs 
have been recently deployed in critical domains. The growing use of these lightweight programs has led to increased scrutiny of their security 
because they include properties ranging from transaction-ordering dependencies to mishandled exceptions that make them susceptible to 
deliberate attacks that can result in direct economic loss [5]–[7]. Therefore, it is crucial to verify the security and reliability of such programs in 
the most rigorous manner available. Among the available verification approaches, higher-order logic theorem proving is one of the most rigorous 
technologies for verifying the properties of programs. This approach involves establishing a formal model of a software system, and then 
verifying the system according to a mathematical proof of the formal model. However, this process suffers from problems associated with 
consistency, reusability, and automation. One of the available solutions for addressing these problems involves designing a formal symbolic 
process virtual machine (FSPVM) based on higher-order theorem proving technology. 
The design and building of a general and powerful FSPVM for certifying and verifying smart contracts operating on multiple blockchain 
platforms has been an ongoing project undertaken by the present authors for some time. In our recent work [8], we presented a theoretical 
FSPVM framework based on our proposed extension of Curry-Howard isomorphism, denoted as execution-verification isomorphism (EVI), for 
automatically verifying lightweight programs and solving the issues associated with reusability, consistency, and automation in higher-order 
theorem proving technology. Specifically, the proposed theoretical FSPVM framework contains four key elements: EVI, a formal general 
memory model, a high-level formal intermediate language that is equivalent to high level programming languages in the real world, and a 
respective formally verified definitional interpreter. Subsequently, we adopted the proposed theoretical FSPVM framework to build an FSPVM, 
denoted as FSPVM-E, in Coq for the verification of Ethereum smart contracts [9]. FSPVM-E was constructed using a general, extensible, and 
reusable formal memory (GERM) framework, an extensible intermediate programming language denoted as Lolisa [10], which is a large subset 
of the Solidity programming language with a mechanized syntax and semantics, and a respective formal interpreter denoted as FEther. The 
FEther interpreter is the final critical component of FSPVM-E that integrates the trusted core of Coq, GERM, and Lolisa. However, our past 
work has demonstrated that, if FEther is designed according to the standard approach recommended by most relevant research studies and 
tutorials regarding programming language formalism and interpreter design (e.g., [22]), its symbolic execution efficiency is extremely low. This 
low execution efficiency of FEther directly influences the verification efficiency and the automation level of FSPVM-E because FEther is 
employed for parsing the domain specific language (i.e., Lolisa in the present development), implementing program behavior, modifying the 
formal memory space, and generating the final logic memory state for program verification, and therefore serves as the proof engine of the 
overall FSPVM-E framework. As such, this is a crucial issue that must be addressed. 
The present work addresses this crucial issue associated with FEther by building a general abstract formal interpreter model to analyze and 
optimize the design of formal interpreters built in higher-order logic theorem proving assistants. Analysis identifies three essential causes of the 
low execution efficiency of FEther, which are denoted as call-by-name termination (CBNT), information redundancy explosion (IRE), and 
concurrent reduction (CR). Next, we build abstract models specific to CBNT, IRE, and CR, and analyze the models in detail to provide 
respective methods for addressing each of these issues. Finally, we apply these schemes to optimize FEther, and demonstrate that the execution 
and verification efficiency of FSPVM-E are improved significantly. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces relevant past studies regarding the formal verification of virtual 
machines and programs. Because the nature of our present work regarding the optimization of FEther requires that we first introduce some 
essential concepts and definitions introduced in our past work, Section 3 elaborates on the foundational concepts and definitions required by the 
present work. Section 4 presents the respective abstract models and analyses specific to CBNT, IRE, and CR. Section 5 describes the solutions 
established for each issue, and presents experimental verification results based on example smart contracts obtained using FEther after 
optimization. Section 6 presents the conclusions of our work and the directions of our future efforts. 
  
2. Related Work 
The work of this paper was primarily inspired by the symbolic process virtual machine KLEE [11], which is a well-known and successful 
certification tool based on symbolic execution. However, it must be noted that many recent tools are based on symbolic execution [12], but most 
of them adopt model checking technology as their foundation, and few are developed in a higher-order logic theorem proving system to enable 
real-world programs to be symbolically executed, and their properties verified automatically using the execution result. However, FSVPM-E 
supports the higher-order verification of complex properties. In addition, while the verification efficiency of these previously developed 
symbolic execution tools is reasonably high, we can expect that FSVPM-E will provide a similarly high verification efficiency when properly 
optimized. Moreover, the fundamental theory of the FEther is a type of higher-order predicate logic which can inductively express all execution 
situations of a program. Compared with the traditional testing technologies, the FEther satisfied the completeness. 
In addition to general verification tools, a number of well-known projects have been developed for the verification of Ethereum smart 
contracts. For example, the formal semantics denoted as KEVM [16] were developed for the formal low-level programming verification of 
Solidity bytecode on the EVM platform using the K-framework, like the formalization conducted in Lem [17]. Because KEVM is executable, it 
can run the validation test suite provided by the Ethereum foundation. However, the low-level verification conducted by KEVM makes it poorly 
suited to high-level programming languages, such as Solidity, which was a primary motivation for the development of FSVPM-E. 
A number of interesting projects have been undertaken that employ higher-order theorem proving assistants as the fundamental platform. 
For example, Frama-C [18] is an extensible and collaborative platform dedicated to the source-code analysis of software written in the C 
programming language. In addition, VST [19] is one of the powerful program verification toolchains based on the CompCert project [20], and 
SMTCoq [21] is another interesting project for developing automatic theorem proving tools. Unfortunately, these platforms also fail to provide a 
suitable combination of symbolic execution and higher-order theorem proving. Moreover, these studies fail to discuss the verification 
efficiencies obtained and the optimization schemes employed in their work. 
In light of the above analysis of past studies, we note that the present work represents the first systematic discussion regarding the 
optimization of symbolic execution efficiency in higher-order theorem proving assistants, such as Coq and Isabelle. Moreover, the effect of these 
optimization schemes is also confirmed by their application to a formally verified interpreter. 
3. Foundational concepts and definitions 
Real world virtual machines of high-level programming languages, such as Smalltalk, Java, and. Net, typically support bytecode as their 
instruction set architecture (ISA) and are implemented by translating the bytecode for commonly used code paths into native machine code. In 
contrast, an FSPVM takes the specification functional programming language (FPL) provided by a higher-order theorem proving assistant, such 
as Gallina in Coq, as the bytecode, the formal memory framework (FMemory) as the memory space, and the trusted core of the proving assistant 
as the CPU. However, the trusted core of a proof assistant has only two functions, i.e., evaluating and proving. As such, the fundamental 
environment provided by Coq is not sufficient to symbolically execute programs written by a mainstream higher-order programming language ℒ, 
and thereby obtain logic memory states. Therefore, the proof environment of higher-order theorem proving assistants must be extended. A 
blueprint for the previously proposed logic memory state generation process [8] is illustrated in Figure 1, where a high-level formal intermediate 
language ℱℒ, which is equivalent to ℒ, is adopted for rewriting a real-world program (RWprogram) as a formal RWprogram (FRWprogram), 
and the respective formally verified interpreter (ℱℐ) is formalized in the FSPVM. The executable semantics of ℱℒ play the role of the ISA of 
ℱℐ. In addition, ℱℐ plays the role of the core of the execution engine in the FSPVM whose task is to simulate the real execution process of 
FRWprograms and generate logic memory states. FSPVM-E is wholly developed in Coq with FMemory based on the GERM model, ℱℒ 
specified as Lolisa, and ℱℐ specified as FEther. 
 
Figure 1. Equivalence between the execution of a real world program (RWprogram) written in a higher-order programming language ℒ and 
execution in a logic environment using a high-level formal intermediate language ℱℒ, which is equivalent to ℒ, to rewrite RWprogram as a 
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formal RWprogram (FRWprogram) in conjunction with a formal memory framework (FMemory) as the memory space and a respective formally 
verified interpreter (ℱℐ) 
The abstract syntax of Lolisa includes contract declaration (Contract), modifier declaration (Modifier), variable declaration (Var), structure 
declaration (Struct), assignment (Assign), return (Return), multi-value return (Returns), throw (Throw), skip (Snil), function definition (Fun), 
while loop (𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑙 ), for loop (𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑓𝑜𝑟), function call (𝐹𝑢𝑛  𝑙𝑙), conditional (If), and sequence (Seq) statements. However, the issues specific 
to CBNT, IRE, and CR, which form the basis of the present work, are exclusively related to only Seq statements. Therefore, only the syntax 
details of the Seq constructor are explicitly defined in Figure 2. Details regarding the other statements employed by Lolisa are reported in our 
previous work [10]. In addition, the development of FEther in Coq and its verification process will be simplified if the FRWprograms written in 
Lolisa are maintained as structural programs. To ensure this condition, the semantics of Lolisa are made to adhere to the following pointer 
counter axiom. 
Axiom (Pointer Counter) Suppose that, for all statements s, if s is the next execution statement, it must be the head of the statement 
sequence in the next execution iteration. 
Statement: 𝑠:: = Contract | Modifier | Var | Struct | Assignv 
   | Return | Returns | Throw | Snil 
   | Fun | 𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑙  | 𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑓𝑜𝑟 | 𝐹𝑢𝑛  𝑙𝑙 | If | Seq(𝑠, 𝑠′) 
Figure. 2. Abstract syntax of Lolisa sequence (Seq) statements 
Table 1 summarizes the helper functions used in the dynamic semantic definitions. Table 2 lists the state functions used to calculate 
commonly needed values from the current state of programs. All of these state functions will be encountered in the following discussion. 
Components of specific states will be denoted using the appropriate Greek letter subscripted by the state of interest. As shown in Table 2, the 
context of the formal memory space is denoted as 𝑀, where 𝜎 is employed to denote a specific memory state, and the context of the execution 
environment is represented as ℰ. Furthermore, we assign 𝛺 as the native value set of the basic logic system. Also, the proof evaluation will 
execute in the proof contexts, which we will denote as 𝛤, 𝛤1, etc. For brevity in the following discussion, we will assign ℱ to represent the 
overall formal system. All the following subsections present semantics evaluation relations of the form 𝜎0  ⇓    〈𝜎1〉, where 𝜎0 and 𝜎1 are the 
initial and final memory states, respectively, 𝑣0 represents the form of Lolisa syntax being defined, and the nature of 𝑣1 depends on the precise 
evaluation relation being defined. The terms 𝑒𝑛𝑣  and 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣  represent the current execution environment and the super environment, 
respectively. 
Table 1. State functions 
ℰ environment information ℱ formal system world 
𝛭 memory space 𝛤 proof context 
 
Table 2. Helper functions 
𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑣  Changes the current environment 𝑒𝑛𝑣 ℎ  𝑘  Validates the current environment 
Statement outcomes: out : ∶= normal  continue with the next statement 
      | stop  stop executing current statement 
      | error  stop executing current statement with error message 
      | exit  function exit 
4. Problem analysis 
As discussed, the computational efficiency of the previous development of FEther was not sufficiently high to execute and verify formal 
programs written in Lolisa. A simple example of this can be illustrated by the conditional statement given as Example 1, as follows:  
𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑤 ≝ ∀(𝑠, 𝑠
′: 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡) , 𝑖𝑓 (𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒){ 𝑡h𝑟𝑜𝑤 (); }𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 {𝑠; }𝑠′, (Example 1) 
where 𝑡h𝑟𝑜𝑤 () is a widely defined special function in programming languages like JavaScript that is called to throw out an executing program. 
This simple code segment will execute 𝑡h𝑟𝑜𝑤 () to throw out an executing program and return the initial memory state  𝑖 𝑖 . However, as 
shown in the Figure 3, executing (i.e., verifying) this very simple code segment using the non-optimized development of FEther requires an 
execution time of 92.546 s, which is unacceptably long. 
 Figure 3. Evaluation time required for Example 1 by the non-optimized FEther 
First, we must obtain an objective appraisal of the computational efficiency of FEther. To this end, we employed the example smart 
contracts given in [4] as the testing data set, and evaluated the maximum execution time required by FEther. These example smart contracts 
include from 0 to 35 lines both with quantifier abstraction (like Example 1) and without quantifier abstraction. We employed 5 identical personal 
computers with equivalent hardware of 8 G memory and a 3.20 GHz CPU, and equivalent software, including Windows 10 and CoqIDE 8.6. 
Each computer executed the same data set 100 times to obtain the peak execution times of the FEther evaluation process. The results are shown 
in Figure 4. If we set an execution time limitation of 3600 s, programs written in Lolisa without quantifier abstraction that are greater than 30 
lines will exceed the limitation, and programs with quantifier abstraction that are greater than about 15 lines will exceed the limitation. 
Through analyzing the results given in Figure 4, we can determine that the standard implementation of FEther, which requires that sequence 
statements be defined explicitly, will generate a volume of logic information in the current context 𝛤  that will exceed the affordable range of 
higher-order theorem proving assistants, making the evaluation efficiency extremely low. As discussed, the extremely low computational 
efficiency is specifically caused and exacerbated by the three crucial problems CBNT, IRE, and CR. These problems are analyzed and defined in 
the following subsections. 
 
Figure 4. Maximum evaluation times of FEther for example smart contracts given in [4] 
Problem 1 (call-by-name termination) The root of CBNT is caused by the evaluation strategy of lambda calculus while FEther is 
evaluating the semantics of Seq statements. 
First, we note that the essence of a formal interpreter ℱℐ employed as part of an FSPVM framework is a large recursive function written in 
the specification language provided by a higher-order theorem proving system. The type of ℱℐ can be abstractly defined as follows. 
ℱℐ ∷ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦 → 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦 (1) 
Therefore, the symbolic execution process 𝑃    is equivalent with the process of evaluating recursive functions 𝑃 𝑣 𝑙 in a higher-order 
theorem proving system, as indicated by the following expression. 
𝛺,𝛭,ℱ ⊢𝑖   𝑃   ≡ 𝑃 𝑣 𝑙 (2) 
Next, we note that the Seq statement is one of the most essential statements that is used in formal semantics, including operational semantics, 
denotational semantics and axiom semantics, to connect the remaining types of statements. In most relevant research studies and tutorials 
regarding programming language formalism and interpreter design (e.g., [22]), it is standard to explicitly define the abstract syntax and 




































according to rules EVAL-STT-SEQ1 and EVAL-STT-SEQ2 below [10]. In Coq, statements are mechanized as an inductive type statement that is 
constructed by specific statement constructors, representing statement tokens. Therefore, an FRWprogram can be summarized according to 
expression (3) below. 
𝛭⊢𝜎        ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢  0, 1
 0≠𝑆 𝑞( , 
′) ∧ 𝜎⇓𝑠0( 𝜎
′, 𝑜𝑟𝑚 𝑙)
  𝑣𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘(  𝑣,𝑓  𝑣)↪ 𝑟   ∧    𝑒𝑛𝑣(𝑆 𝑞( 0, 1),  𝑣)↪𝑆𝑜𝑚    𝑣
′
ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢ 〈𝜎,  𝑣,𝑓  𝑣,𝑆 𝑞( 0, 1)〉 ⇒ 〈𝜎
′⇓𝑠1,  𝑣
′,𝑓  𝑣, 𝑜𝑟𝑚 𝑙〉
 (EVAL-STT-SEQ1) 
𝛭⊢𝜎        ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢  0, 1
 0≠𝑆 𝑞( , 
′) ∧ 𝜎⇓𝑠0( 𝜎
′, 𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟)
  𝑣𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘(  𝑣,𝑓  𝑣)↪ 𝑟   ∧    𝑔𝑎𝑠(𝑆 𝑞( 0, 1),  𝑣)↪𝑆𝑜𝑚    𝑣
′
ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢ 〈𝜎,  𝑣,𝑓  𝑣,𝑆 𝑞( 0, 1)〉 ⇒ 〈𝜎
′,  𝑣′,𝑓  𝑣, 𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟〉
 (EVAL-STT-SEQ2) 
𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ≝ (𝑆𝑒𝑞 𝑠0  (𝑆𝑒𝑞 𝑠1  (… (𝑆𝑒𝑞 𝑠 −1(𝑆𝑒𝑞 𝑠  𝑆𝑛𝑖𝑙))))) , (𝑠𝑖 ≠ 𝑆𝑒𝑞(∗), 𝑖 ∈ ℕ) (3) 
According to EVAL-STT-SEQ1 and EVAL-STT-SEQ2, using the standard approach to evaluate a valid Seq statement s, where 𝑠 ≡ 𝑆𝑒𝑞 𝑠0 𝑠1, 
𝑠0 and 𝑠1 represent two arbitrary statements, and 𝑠0 ≠ 𝑆𝑒𝑞(∗), requires that s be processed according to the algorithm given in Table 3, where 
ℱℐ is defined as a partial function that returns an option type to indicate success or failure. 
Table 3. Standard algorithm defining ℱℐ evaluation 
Algorithm ℱℐ_enter_point 
Function: Fixpoint ℱℐ 
Input: Initial optional memory state ⟦      ⟧, current environment 𝑒𝑛𝑣, super environment 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, initial arguments 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠, and 
valid 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ; 
Output: Final memory state signed with optional type; 
𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟎: if 𝑒𝑛𝑣 ℎ  𝑘(𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣) = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, then 𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑣(𝑆𝑒𝑞(𝑠0, 𝑠1), 𝑒𝑛𝑣) ↪ 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑣
′ and go to 𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟏; else, exit; 
𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟏: if 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 = 𝑆𝑒𝑞(𝑠0, 𝑠1), then go to 𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟐, else, 
(𝑒𝑛𝑣. 𝐾,      , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠, 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ) ⇓𝑃(𝐹𝑅𝑊 𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟 𝑚); 
𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟐: if 𝑠0 ≠ 𝑆𝑒𝑞(∗), then 𝒍𝒆𝒕 ⟦      
′
⟧ : = ℱℐ(⟦      ⟧, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠, 𝑠0) and go to 𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟑, else, throw out program; 
𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟑: ℱℐ (⟦      
′
⟧ , 𝑒𝑛𝑣′, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠, 𝑠1) 
 
Because FRWprograms are guaranteed to be structural programs by applying the Program Counter axiom, we can directly employ a pattern 
matching mechanism to obtain the next instruction. However, as shown in Figure 2, Seq is also a constructor of the statement type. Therefore, 
ℱℐ must first determine whether the head statement in the current context 𝛤  is a Seq statement. If this is the case, ℱℐ must evaluate the 
statement 𝑠0 stored in Seq again by recursively calling itself. In higher-order theorem proving assistants, such as Coq, a recursive function will 
create a new logic proof context 𝛤′ each time a 𝛽-reduction is applied. Therefore, the current ℱℐ evaluation belongs to 𝛤 , and the 
expression ℱℐ(⟦      ⟧, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠, 𝑠0) in 𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟐 of the algorithm in Table 3 belongs to 𝛤
′. Most specification languages, such as 
Gallina, are a type of non-Turing-complete FPL that treats functions as “first-class citizens” [23], and these specification languages therefore 
have no mutable state like that usually applied in imperative programming languages to store the result generated in 𝛤′. The standard solution 
for addressing this condition in functional programming is to employ a let expression to connect contexts 𝛤c and 𝛤
′, and temporarily store the 
new memory state  𝜎′ generated by the process of executing 𝑠0. In this way, 𝜎
′ can be taken as the initial memory state in the next iteration 
cycle for executing 𝑠1. However, implementing ℱℐ according to the standard approach given in Table 3 includes a hidden problem, in that the 
actual order of expression evaluation is the opposite to that expected. Specifically, if FRWprogram is a statement stream connected by a Seq 
constructor, as defined by the expression 
𝛭⊢𝑚𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒        ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢ 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚     ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑠     ℱ ⊢ 𝐾
𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚
𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠
→         𝑆𝑒𝑞(𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑠1)
𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠
→         𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∧ 𝑠1
(𝑒𝑛𝑣.𝐾,⟦𝑚𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒⟧,𝑒𝑛𝑣,𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣,𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑠,𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚)⇓𝑃(𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡)
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠





⟧,   𝑒𝑛𝑣(  𝑣),𝑓  𝑣,  𝑟 , 1)
, (4) 
the ideal order of FRWprogram evaluation should be identical with the order in the real world, as follows: 
1) get the current execution statement 𝑠  𝑟𝑟   ; 
2) evaluate 𝑠  𝑟𝑟    and generate the new memory state ⟦      
′
⟧ using ℱℐ; 
3) call the next statement 𝑠1 in ℱℐ recursively. 
As such, the ideal evaluation order is that the next instruction will not be executed until the current instruction is simplified as a normal form of 
the memory state. 
Nonetheless, the standard solution of employing a let expression to obtain an ideal evaluation order encounters difficulties with respect to 
the evaluation strategy of lambda calculus adopted as the fundamental theory by most higher-order logic theorem proving systems. Here, the let 
expression is defined in lambda calculus as a lambda abstraction [24]. For example, 𝒍𝒆𝒕 𝑓 𝑥 = 𝑦 𝒊𝒏 𝑧 means that a function 𝑓 is defined by 
𝑓 𝑥 = 𝑦, which is equivalent with the lambda expression (𝜆 𝑓. 𝑧)(𝜆 𝑥. 𝑦), where 𝜆 represents the abstraction. The formal definition of the let 
expression is defined according to the following rule. 
𝒍𝒆𝒕 𝑥: 𝑇 𝒊𝒏 𝑦 ≡ (𝜆 𝑥. 𝑦) (LET-ABS) 
In addition, the let expression allows application and substitution to be applied to other expressions according to the respective following rules. 
𝑥 ∉ 𝐹𝑉(𝑦) ⟹ ((𝒍𝒆𝒕 (𝑥: 𝑇) : = 𝑀 𝒊𝒏 𝑦) ⇔ (𝒍𝒆𝒕 𝑥: = 𝑀 𝒊𝒏 𝑦) ≡ (𝜆 𝑥. 𝑦) 𝑀) (LET-APP) 
𝑥 ∉ 𝐹𝑉(𝑦) ⟹ (𝒍𝒆𝒕 (𝑥: 𝑇) : = 𝑀 𝒊𝒏 𝑦) ≡ (𝜆 𝑥. 𝑦) 𝑀 ⟹ 𝑦[𝑥 ≔ 𝑀] (LET-SUB) 
In rule LET-APP, if 𝑥 ∉ 𝐹𝑉(𝑦), where ∀ 𝐸. 𝐹𝑉(𝐸) represents the free variable set of expression 𝐸, then expression 𝑀 can be applied to 
expression (𝑥: 𝑇) bound in expression 𝑦. According to the substitution rule of lambda calculus [25], we can simplify rule LET-APP to obtain 
rule LET-SUB. Thus, the computational formal semantics given in Table 3 can be abstracted as Table 4, and, according to rules LET-ABS, 
LET-APP, and LET-SUB, the implementations in Tables 3 and 4 are identical. 
Table 4. Abstract definition of ℱℐ evaluation in lambda form 
𝒇𝒊𝒙 ℱℐ ≡ 
𝜆 (ℱℐ: 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦 → 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 → 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦). 
  𝜆 (𝑠: 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡). 𝜆 (𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡: 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒). 𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣: 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (      : 𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦). . 
  {| 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 ⟼ 
    {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑣′⟼ 
      {| 𝑆𝑒𝑞 𝑠0 𝑠1⟼ 
        (𝜆 (      
′
: 𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦) . ℱℐ (      
′
, 𝑒𝑛𝑣′, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡, 𝑠1)) 
              (ℱℐ(      , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡, 𝑠0)); 
        __ ⟼ 𝑆𝑜 𝑒       |}. 𝑠; 
     𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 ⟼ 𝑆𝑜 𝑒       |}. 𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑣(𝑒𝑛𝑣) 
   𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 ⟼ 𝑆𝑜 𝑒       |}. (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ℎ  𝑘(𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣)) 
 
As discussed, ℱℐ is essentially a large recursive function written in a specification language. Therefore, according to rules LET-APP and 
LET-SUB, the let expression for sub-statement 𝑠0 given in formula (5) below can be converted into formula (6), and then evaluated as formula 
(7) using the evaluation tactic simpl or cbn provided by the Coq tactic mechanism. 
𝒍𝒆𝒕      
′
: : = ℱℐ (      , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑠, 𝑠0) 𝒊𝒏 ℱℐ (      
′
, , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑠, 𝑠1) 
(5) 
(𝜆 (      
′
: 𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦) . ℱℐ (      
′
, 𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑣(𝑒𝑛𝑣), 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡, 𝑠1)) (ℱℐ (      , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡, 𝑠0)) 
(6) 
(ℱℐ ((ℱℐ (𝑔𝑎𝑠,      , 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡, 𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑣(𝑒𝑛𝑣), 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠0)), 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡, 𝑠1))  (7) 
Here, we can determine that the expression (ℱℐ(      , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡, 𝑠0)) is applied directly instead of unfolding ℱℐ and reducing this 
expression to a normal form as a new memory state. Therefore, the ideal evaluation order is violated. As such, the root cause of results like 
formula (7) is the evaluation order of lambda calculus. In Coq, the evaluation tactics cbn and simpl adopt the call-by-name evaluation strategy 
[26], which means that the 𝜆-expressions under lambda abstraction will not be reduced, and the arguments to a function call will not be 
evaluated, even though the 𝜆-expressions are not normal forms. A simple example of the call-by-name evaluation strategy is illustrated in Table 
5, which demonstrates that the expression (𝜆 𝑦: 𝑖𝑛𝑡. (𝜆 𝑥: 𝑖𝑛𝑡. 𝑦 + 𝑥)) (1 + 3) cannot be reduced to 𝜆 𝑥: 𝑖𝑛𝑡. 4 + 𝑥 using this strategy. The 
only method of simplifying the expression 𝜆 𝑥: 𝑖𝑛𝑡. 1 + 3 + 𝑥 is to specify 𝑥 in such a way as to make the expression free of 𝜆-expressions. 
Moreover, according to [27], the evaluation tactics cbn and simpl will attempt first to apply 𝛽-reduction and 𝜄-reduction, and will then attempt 
to apply 𝜎-reductions if necessary. Notice that only transparent constants whose identifier can be reused in the recursive calls are possibly 
unfolded by simpl and cbn. Accordingly, the evaluation process is illustrated in Table 6. We note from the table that the logic expression 
generated by the recursive function will not be simplified until the entire 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎  connected by the Seq constructor has been unfolded 
completely, which yields the following expression: 
(ℱℐ (ℱℐ −1 (… (ℱℐ1(ℱℐ0( 0, 𝑠0,∗)))))), (8) 
where ℱℐ𝑖  (𝑖 ∈ ℕ) represents the i
th recursive call of ℱℐ, and the wildcard * represents irrelevant parameters. Here, all let expressions of 
ℱℐ(      , 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 𝑠,∗) have been applied and 𝜆-abstraction has been eliminated. Therefore, expression (8) is free of 𝜆-expressions, and 
can be unfolded and simplified from the outside to the inside. 
Table 5. Simple example of a call-by-name evaluation strategy 
(𝜆 𝑦: 𝑖𝑛𝑡. (𝜆 𝑥: 𝑖𝑛𝑡. 𝑦 + 𝑥)) (1 + 3) 
⇒𝛽 (𝜆 𝑦: 𝑖𝑛𝑡. (𝜆 𝑥: 𝑖𝑛𝑡. 𝑦 + 𝑥)) [𝑦 ≔ (1 + 3)] 
⇒𝛽 𝜆 𝑥: 𝑖𝑛𝑡. 1 + 3 + 𝑥 
⇏𝛽 𝜆 𝑥: 𝑖𝑛𝑡. 4 + 𝑥 
Table 6. Iterations associated with ℱℐ evaluation 
ℱℐ(      , 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 𝑠,∗) 
  𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑑
⇒    ℱℐ (      , (𝑆𝑒𝑞 𝑠0  (𝑆𝑒𝑞 𝑠1  (… (𝑆𝑒𝑞 𝑠 −1(𝑆𝑒𝑞 𝑠  𝑆𝑛𝑖𝑙))))) ,∗) 
 𝑏 






⇒ 𝛽𝜄𝜎 ℱℐ (ℱℐ (…(ℱℐ(ℱℐ(      , 𝑠0,∗), 𝑠1,∗))) , (𝑆𝑒𝑞 𝑠 −1(𝑆𝑒𝑞 𝑠  𝑆𝑛𝑖𝑙)),∗) 
 𝑏 
⇒ 𝛽𝜄𝜎 ℱℐ (ℱℐ ((… (ℱℐ(ℱℐ(      , 𝑠0,∗), 𝑠1,∗))) , 𝑠 −1,∗) , (𝑆𝑒𝑞 𝑠  𝑆𝑛𝑖𝑙),∗) 
 𝑏 
⇒ 𝛽𝜄𝜎 ℱℐ (ℱℐ ((… (ℱℐ(ℱℐ(      , 𝑠0,∗), 𝑠1,∗))) , 𝑠 −1,∗) , 𝑠 ,∗) 
 
According to the above analysis, the result cannot be simplified and evaluated in the actual execution process until all recursive calls of 
ℱℐ are completed. Therefore, the actual evaluation order is given as follows: 
𝛭⊢𝑚𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒        ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢ 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚     ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢ 𝑝𝑎𝑟     ℱ ⊢ 𝐾
𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚
𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠
→         𝑆𝑒𝑞(𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑠1)
𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠
→         𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∧ 𝑠1
𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠(𝑝𝑎𝑟)↪𝑝𝑎𝑟
′
ℱℐ(ℱℐ(⟦𝑚𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒⟧,  𝑣,𝑓  𝑣,  𝑟, 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡),  𝑣,𝑓  𝑣,  𝑟
′, 1)
. (9) 
This order can be explicitly stated as follows: 
1) get the current execution statement 𝑠  𝑟𝑟   ; 
2) call the next statement 𝑠1 in ℱℐ recursively with the function call of 𝑠  𝑟𝑟   ; 
3) evaluate the entire FRWprogram and generate the final memory state ⟦ 𝑓𝑖  𝑙⟧ with ℱℐ. 
Obviously, in the actual evaluation process, ℱℐ takes the entire FRWprogram rather than a single statement as an evaluation unit. Thus, the 
information generated from the iterations cannot be directly simplified in normal form, and the volume of information of the current context will 
be too great to simplify. This condition can be abstracted as follows. 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑧 ≡ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ) (10) 
In addition, the above analysis indicates that an arbitrary statement within an FRWprogram composed of n statements can be evaluated after 2n 
iterations. Thus, the average number of iterations is 𝑛 ∗
2 
 
. Hence, the time complexity of this process is 𝑂(𝑛). 
The results presented in Figure 5 verify that the execution process in Coq is identical with the above analysis. Accordingly, the space 
resource of higher-order theorem proving assistants, such as Coq, will be consumed by a large volume of non-normal form logic expressions like 
that given in (8). Therefore, the size of an FRWprogram directly decreases the evaluation efficiency of the proof engine, and may even result in 
the failure of symbolic execution due to overload. 
 Figure 5. Embedded execution result of FEther in Coq 
To further clarify this issue, we define an abstract recursive type ident in Figure 6. Here, the identifier ident is its name and sort is its type. 
The identifiers 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒0 to 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒  are the names of the ident recursive base constructors, and 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 is the rule that reduces all other cases 
toward the base constructors. The binders 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟0 to 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟  are the quantifiers (such as ∀ and ∃), and ?̅? represents the type set of other 
inductive types. These terms are optional, which is indicated by placing the terms within square brackets. An inspection of Figure 6 reveals that 
𝑆𝑒𝑞: 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 is obviously a special case of ident, in that 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖: [[𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖] 𝜏?̅?] → 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 → [… ] →
𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 is specified as the form 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠  𝑞: 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡     𝑚   → 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡     𝑚   → 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡     𝑚   . As discussed above, the absence of a mutable 
state in most FPLs requires that, if the parameters in the constructor, which must be evaluated in 𝛤c, and are therefore denoted as base 
parameters, cannot be evaluated, we can only transmit the base parameters into the next recursive circle or discard them. However, it is also clear 
that the transmission of base parameters is limited because, if the current recursion period transmits 𝑛 base parameters into the next recursion 
period, then the next recursion period must in turn transmit 2𝑛 base parameters. Therefore, the mth recursion period will need to transmit  ∗ 𝑛 
base parameters into the next recursion period. The strict type system employed by higher-order theorem proving assistants requires that the 
parameters and the respective types of each function must be defined explicitly. Hence, it is impossible to transmit the remaining base 
parameters into the next recursion period. 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∶ [[𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟] ?̅?] →  𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∶= 
 | 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒0 ∶ [[𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟0] 𝜏0̅] → 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 
 | 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒1 ∶ [[𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟1] 𝜏1̅] → 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 
 … 
 | 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 ∶ [[𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖] 𝜏?̅?] → 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 → [… ] → 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 
 … 
. 
Figure 6. An abstract data type that illustrates the call-by-name termination (CBNT) problem 
 Unfortunately, most higher-order theorem proving assistants adopt call-by-name as their essential evaluation strategy. Thus, CBNT is a 
common problem in all studies where researchers have followed the standard approach for designing a computational proof engine in these 
higher-order theorem proving assistants to evaluate formal programs at the code level, or when researchers have defined very large recursive 
functions to evaluate recursive datatypes like the abstract datatype given in Figure 6. 
 Problem 2 (Information redundancy explosion) The cause of IRE is primarily the result of a common programming style, and IRE is 
exacerbated by CBNT. In most cases, the major component of functions written in FPLs consists of conditional statements defined by a pattern 
matching mechanism. In general, the programming style involves defining these conditions explicitly in the function body rather than 
encapsulating these conditions as a function interface. In fact, higher-order theorem proving assistants actually encourage users to apply this type 
of programming style in programs. To this end, proof assistants provide wildcard syntactic sugar to simplify the manual definition, and the 
built-in interpreter will automatically fill the wildcard during the evaluation process. A simple example of this process is given in Table 7 for an 
inductive type T that has three constructors A, B, and C. Here, wildcards have been used to define a function on the left side of the table, and the 





Table 7. Simple example of pattern matching definition in Coq. The definition with wildcards is given on the left, while the actual definition 
completed by the core of Coq is given on the right. 
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 (𝑎: 𝑇): 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙 ≔ 
  𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑎 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 
  | 𝐴 ⇒ 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 
  | _  ⇒ 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 
 𝑒𝑛𝑑. 
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 (𝑎: 𝑇): 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙 ≔ 
  𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑎 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 
  | 𝐴 ⇒ 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 
  | 𝐵 ⇒ 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 | 𝐶 ⇒ 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 
 𝑒𝑛𝑑. 
 
In addition, as discussed above, the evaluation tactics cbn and simpl can only be successfully applied to transparent logic expressions free of 
𝜆-abstraction [27]. In other words, proof assistants like Coq only apply 𝛽-reduction rules for 𝜆-expressions when the top-level structure [28] of 
the terms of the 𝜆-expressions is deconstructed as specific constructors without 𝜆-abstraction. This is illustrated by the simple example given in 
Table 7 based on the process. Here, researchers seeking to prove the theorem ∀ (𝑎: 𝑇), 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎 ∧ 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 = 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 in a proof assistant like Coq 
requires the completion of two basic steps. First, according to higher-order lambda calculus, the theorem ∀ (𝑎: 𝑇), 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎 ∧ 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 = 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 is 
equivalent with 𝜆 (𝑎: 𝑇), 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎 ∧ 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 = 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒. Hence, the 𝜆-abstraction should be specified with a term of type 𝑇. To avoid confusion, the 
specific term is bound with the name 𝑎0. Therefore, 𝜆 (𝑎: 𝑇), 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎 ∧ 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 = 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 is transformed as (𝑎0: 𝑇) ⊢ 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎0  ∧ 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 = 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒. 
Second, the 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 will be unfolded in 𝛤  as follows. 
( 𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑎0 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ | 𝐴 ⇒ 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 | _  ⇒ 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑑) ∧ 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 = 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 (11) 
Because 𝑎0 is a top-level structure term, the expression given in (11) cannot be simplified directly. Therefore, 𝑎0 should be deconstructed 
according to its constructors A, B, and C, which generates three sub-goals of the proof, respectively. Each sub-goal can be proven easily, where 
the sub-goal of A can be evaluated as true, while the sub-goals of B and C can be evaluated as false. 
The evaluation and verification process illustrated by the above example is equivalent with that conducted by the proposed FSPVM-E. As 
discussed previously, FEther is a recursive function that is constructed entirely based on the GERM framework in Coq, so the sum total of logic 
information, such as 𝜆-expressions and proof terms, must be evaluated and verified in 𝛤  by the trusted core of the proof assistant, which 
contrasts with the process conducted in a real world virtual machine using actual hardware. Therefore, during the ideal process of evaluating 
FRWprograms and generating the new memory state ⟦      
′
⟧ using ℱℐ, the entire ℱℐ structure is treated as a function definition, and 
unfolded in 𝛤 . 
However, this process includes a hidden problem. A higher-order theorem proving system must display all logic information in the same 
level context to maintain logical consistency. In other words, all logic expressions defined explicitly according to the standard programming 
style, rather than being encapsulated as a function interface, will be displayed in 𝛤  by the proof assistant. Therefore, as discussed above, all 
wildcards in the definition of ℱℐ will be automatically filled, and pattern matching conducted without definition encapsulation will be unfolded 
in 𝛤 . However, because the logic information in 𝛤  cannot be simplified and evaluated by tactics prior to deconstructing the top-level structure 
terms of the 𝜆-expressions as specific constructors without 𝜆-abstraction, very large formal programs like the non-optimized version of FEther 
will generate more than 5000 lines of logic expressions in 𝛤  during a single recursive cycle. 
In addition, as shown in Table 3, the first step is to recursively apply ℱℐ for the next statement and nestedly unfold ℱℐ𝑖 in 𝛤 , rather than 
simplifying the terms of 𝛤 . Therefore, pattern matching in the function body cannot be simplified promptly, and all definitions in all branches 
will be unfolded in 𝛤 . Unfortunately, most branches need not be unfolded in 𝛤  because the natural deduction systems of higher-order theorem 
proving theory can prune irrelevant branches. Specifically, according to the inductive datatype principle, all constructors of a datatype are 
mutually exclusive with each other. This is illustrated by expression (11), where it is impossible to generate constructors A and B into the 
matching guard of test simultaneously. Hence, a single branch at most of a pattern matching process can be derived by a deterministic state 𝛷𝑖 
of 𝛤  during the forward reasoning deduction process, and other branches will be filtered out. This is abstracted as follows. 
𝛤 (𝛷𝑖) ⊳ (𝐵0, 𝐵1, … , 𝐵 )
⟦𝐵𝑖⟧
 (12) 
As such, the definitions belonging to these irrelevant branches will not be unfolded in 𝛤 . This condition is illustrated by the test shown in 
Figure 3. Here, when 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑤 is evaluated in Coq, the statement s is bound with a universal quantifier, which is an unknown top-level value 
term. Therefore, for s, which has type statement, all its possible pattern matching combinations, including all branches and sub-branches, will be 
explicitly presented in the current logic context of Coq. In Figure 7, this process generated 10,736 lines of logic information in the current 
context. However, according to the logic process of 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑤, if the condition expression is true, the result of 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑤 is fixed as 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑚 and 
independent of s. As such, the frustrating truth is that most of the logic information details in the 10,736 lines are redundant and irrelevant. 
Therefore, although the conditional statement given in Example 1 is very simple, s is a top-level term that cannot be simplified directly, and, 
because s is unfolded first, but is evaluated last, CBNT exacerbates the problem of IRE, resulting in an excessive volume of unnecessary logic 
expressions that must be handled by the trusted core of the proof assistant. 
 
Figure 7. Example illustrating irrelevant logic information unfolding in the proof context 
We also note that, in addition to the size of FRWprograms, the size and complexity of the ℱℐ structure are also elements influencing the 
computational efficiency because the function evaluation process typically generates a large volume of logic information combinations, 
particularly for a very large recursive function like ℱℐ. Therefore, we redefine formula (10) as follows. 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑧 ≡ (𝑛𝑢 (𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ) ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(ℱℐ)) + 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ) (13) 
As mentioned previously, the number of recursion steps required by ℱℐ is equivalent to the number of statements in an FRWprogram, so 
𝑛𝑢 (𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ) represents the nested depth of iterations. In addition, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(ℱℐ) is mainly determined by the branches of the matching 
definition. Thus, it can be summarized as follows. 
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(ℱℐ) ≡ (𝑐 𝑜  𝑏1 + 𝑐  𝑏1 ∗ (𝑐 𝑜  𝑏2 + 𝑐  𝑏2 ∗ (… (𝑐 𝑜  𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐  𝑏𝑖 ∗ (… ))))) (14) 
Here, 𝑐 𝑜  𝑏 represents the average number of constructors without sub-branches, 𝑐  𝑏 represents the average number of constructors with 
sub-branches, and 𝑐  𝑏𝑗 and 𝑐 𝑜  𝑏𝑗 represent the number of sub-branches of 𝑐  𝑏𝑖 (𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ ℕ, 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑗). Obviously, formula (13) can be 
summarized as follows: 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑧 ≡ (𝑛𝑢 (𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ) ∗ (∑ 𝑐 𝑜  𝑏𝑖 ∗ 𝑐  𝑏𝑖−1!
 
𝑖=1 )) + 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ), (15) 
where we use 𝑐  𝑏𝑛! to represent the factorial expression 𝑐  𝑏1 ∗ 𝑐  𝑏2 ∗ … ∗ 𝑐  𝑏𝑛, and 𝑐  𝑏0! = 1. 
 
Figure 8. Example of the unfolding of memory space terms in the proof context 
In addition, for the FSPVM-E framework proposed herein, FEther is based on our GERM framework, which is defined as a large data 
structure with a memory space abstracted as a special record type memory. Therefore, a memory state 𝜎 is treated as a very large record value 
with a  𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦 type in the trusted core of Coq. As such, 𝜎 is treated in the Coq computation process as an unknown top-level structure that 
must be unfolded and deconstructed according to its specific constructors during its evaluation process, and all information stored in the current 
memory state will be shown in the current context while waiting to be simplified. This is illustrated by the Coq evaluation process shown in 
Figure 8 for a simple example. According to the calculus of inductive construction, all identical value terms in the same level context must be 
deconstructed or unfolded simultaneously to maintain consistency. This is defined for FEther as follows. 
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(ℱ𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) ≡ 𝑐 𝑜  𝑏1 + ( 1 + 𝑎1) ∗   𝑖𝑧 + 𝑐  𝑏1 ∗ 
(𝑐 𝑜  𝑏2 + ( 2 + 𝑎2) ∗   𝑖𝑧 + 𝑐  𝑏2 ∗ (… (𝑐 𝑜  𝑏𝑖 + ( 𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖) ∗   𝑖𝑧 + 𝑐  𝑏𝑖 ∗ (… )))) 
(16) 
Here, the values such as memory space terms m, which are a kind of special large value, and memory address terms a in all branches will be 
unfolded simultaneously. We use  𝑖 and 𝑎𝑖 to represent the average number of memory space value terms and address value terms in a branch, 
respectively. Because types memory and address have the same number of constructors, their sizes are identically defined as   𝑖𝑧 . Therefore, 
the size of FEther in the current logic context during the evaluation process is summarized as follows. 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝐹𝐸 ℎ 𝑟 ≡ (𝑛𝑢 (𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ) ∗ (∑(𝑐 𝑜  𝑏𝑖 + ( 𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖) ∗   𝑖𝑧 ) ∗ 𝑐  𝑏𝑖−1!
 
𝑖=0
)) + 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ) (17) 
Clearly, this represents an exponential growth in the volume of information in a given logic context, which results in a very large volume of logic 
information that must be evaluated in a current proving context by proof assistants. Therefore, the burden of computation is very large, even if 
FRWprogram is a very simple code segment. 
Finally, because IRE is caused by the programming style and the basic features of higher-order proof assistants, we note that normal large 
programs developed in higher-order theorem proving assistants will also cause this problem. Hence, the final 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑧  can be abstracted as 
follows. 




]) ∗ 𝑐  𝑏𝑖−1!
 
𝑖=0
)) + 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ) (18) 
Here, 𝑟0 to 𝑟𝑖 represent the number of values constructed by different datatypes, and 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒0 to 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖  represent the number of constructors for 
each respective datatype. In addition, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑧  also contains basic expressions and definitions that can be evaluated directly, and the average 
number of these basic expressions and definitions are defined as 𝑒𝑠𝑖 and 𝑑𝑠𝑖, respectively. 
Problem 3 (Concurrent reduction) The present implementation of FSPVM-E seeks to combine the advantages of model checking and 
theorem proving in proof loops and avoid halting problems. To this end, we have employed Bounded Model Checking (BMC) [29] in EVI by 
allowing FEther to unfold and execute 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 𝑠 only K times. This approach, which is denoted as fuel or pump, avoids functions 
invoking infinite loops, and corresponds to the gas approach employed by Ethereum [31], where the evaluation process of semantics are halted if 
the level of gas fails to pass the gas checking function. 
In the standard FEther design, an equivalent K-limitation is employed to limit the symbolic execution in the statement, expression, and 
value semantic layers simultaneously, rather than using different K values in different layers. However, as discussed previously, all identical 
value terms in the same context must be deconstructed or unfolded simultaneously to maintain consistency. Therefore, the value of K will be 
modified and shared among all layers, and the layers that await the execution result will also be forced to be unfolded, as illustrated in Figure 9. 
While this process will not cause data corruption owing to the forward reasoning of higher-order theorem proving, it will cause IRE to occur 
more frequently because 𝑐 𝑜  𝑏𝑖 will become 𝑐  𝑏𝑖 in formula (14). 
 
Figure 9. Illustration of how the shared K-limitation influences all layers simultaneously 
The simple example given as Example 1 above is employed to illustrate the CR problem in Figure 10. Here, because the different layers 
share an equivalent K-limitation (i.e., pump), when pump in the first matching guard, which belongs to the statement layer, is deconstructed, the 
function fun_expr_addr, which takes pump as its limitation in the Fun branch, will be unfolded at the same time. However, the second matching 
guard cannot simplify the stt in this step. Therefore, fun_expr_addr also cannot be simplified after unfolding, and the logic information will 
remain in the proof context. Unfortunately, this condition will exist in other branches, but most of the branches are irrelevant after the stt is 
deconstructed. This means that a large volume of irrelevant logic information will be generated before the stt is deconstructed. 
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 Figure 10. Example based on Example 1 illustrating the concurrent reduction (CR) problem 
Finally, it should be noted that all functions developed according to BMC in higher-order theorem proving assistants will also suffer from 
CR. 
5. Optimization 
5.1 Solutions for each problem 
According to the above analysis, ℱℐ, like all large programs written by a specification language in higher-order theorem proving assistants 
that adopt the call-by-name strategy and BMC, will be subject to CBNT, IRE, and CR problems. We therefore present three general optimization 
methods for addressing each of these problems respectively. 
Solution 1 (call-by-name termination) To clarify the present discussion, we summarize the cause of CBNT as follows. If the Seq cell 
constructor is defined explicitly in ℱℐ, the execution of ℱℐ requires that the pattern matching mechanism successively obtain the Seq result and 
𝑠0 in the current context 𝛤 . Subsequently, CBNT occurs during the evaluation process where 𝑠0 is evaluated in 𝛤′ and the result is bound in 
𝛤  by the let expression. However, this summary indicates that the CBNT problem can be solved directly if 𝑠0 is directly evaluated in 𝛤  rather 
than in 𝛤′. One of the available solutions is that Seq can be defined implicitly. Specifically, this solution involves removing the Seq constructor 
from the statement inductive datatype, and defining the sequence statement implicitly using the list datatype. The new semantics of the proposed 
sequence statement are defined in rules NEW-STT-SEQ1 and NEW-STT-SEQ2 below. 
𝛭⊢𝜎        ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢  ∶ 𝑙𝑖        𝑚   ′
 𝜎⇓𝑠.ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑( 𝜎
′, 𝑜𝑟𝑚 𝑙)
  𝑣𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘(  𝑣,𝑓  𝑣)↪ 𝑟   ∧    𝑔𝑎𝑠
′
( .ℎ  𝑑∷ 𝑖𝑙,  𝑣)↪𝑆𝑜𝑚    𝑣′
ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢ 〈𝜎,  𝑣,𝑓  𝑣, 〉 ⇒ 〈𝜎′⇓𝑠.𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙,  𝑣
′,𝑓  𝑣, 𝑜𝑟𝑚 𝑙〉
 (NEW-STT-SEQ1) 
𝛭⊢𝜎        ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢  ∶ 𝑙𝑖        𝑚   ′
𝜎⇓𝑠.ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑( 𝜎
′, 𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟)
  𝑣𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘(  𝑣,𝑓  𝑣)↪ 𝑟   ∧    𝑔𝑎𝑠
′
( .ℎ  𝑑∷ 𝑖𝑙,  𝑣)↪𝑆𝑜𝑚    𝑣′
ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢ 〈𝜎,  𝑣,𝑓  𝑣, 〉 ⇒ 〈𝜎′,  𝑣′,𝑓  𝑣, 𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟〉
 (NEW-STT-SEQ2) 
Here, we use list to connect the value constructed by the new statement type statement', which does not have the Seq constructor. Because no 
other semantics are modified, the 𝜎 ⇓    process is still adopted in the new sequence statement semantics. Based on the above definitions, the 
equivalence between the standard sequence statement semantics and the new semantics is proven by the Theorem Sequence Equivalence given 
below. However, we first require an intermediate function 𝒯 to equivalently translate an FRWprogram from the statement type to the statement' 
type. The abstract definition of the translation function is assigned as 𝒯 ∷ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡′. Its expected function is redefining, 
where, 
if FRWprogram is (𝑆𝑒𝑞 𝑠0  (𝑆𝑒𝑞 𝑠1  (… (𝑆𝑒𝑞 𝑠 −1(𝑆𝑒𝑞 𝑠  𝑠𝑛𝑖𝑙))))), the new FRWprogram should be 𝑠0 ∷ 𝑠1 ∷ ⋯ ∷ 𝑠 −1 ∷ 𝑠 ∷ 𝑛𝑖𝑙. The 
correctness of 𝒯 can be guaranteed by the Lemma Translation given below, where we assume that the implementation of 𝒯 is correct. 
Lemma (Translation) ∀  (𝐾: 𝑛𝑎𝑡) (𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 : 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡)  ( : 𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦) (𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣: 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑛𝑡). 
  Judgment 1: (∀ (𝑠0 𝑠1: 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡), 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 = 𝑆𝑒𝑞(𝑠0, 𝑠1) → 𝑠0 ≠ 𝑆𝑒𝑞(∗)) →. 
  Goal: 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 = 𝒯−1(𝒯(𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 )). 
Theorem (Sequence Equivalence) ∀  (𝐾: 𝑛𝑎𝑡) (𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 : 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡)  ( : 𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦) (𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣: 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑛𝑡). 
  Judgment 1: (∀ (𝑠0 𝑠1: 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡), 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 = 𝑆𝑒𝑞(𝑠0, 𝑠1) → 𝑠0 ≠ 𝑆𝑒𝑞(∗)). 
  Goal: ℰ   ( , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ) = ℰ   
′
( , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝒯(𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 )). 
Proof. 
An 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎  is defined with an inductive type. Therefore, it can be inducted as the basic Seq statement 𝑠𝑏, where 𝑠𝑏 ≠ 𝑆𝑒𝑞(∗) 





 has type 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡′. 
First, the proof goal above is converted for 𝑠  to prove ℰ   ( , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠𝑏) = ℰ   
′
( , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠𝑏 ∷ 𝑛𝑖𝑙) . For the left side, 
ℰ   ( , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠𝑏) =  ⇓ 𝑏  according to the rule EVAL-STT-SEQ1. For the right side, ℰ   
′
( , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝒯(𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 )) =
 ⇓( 𝑏∷ 𝑖𝑙).ℎ  𝑑=  ⇓ 𝑏  according to rule NEW-STT-SEQ1. Therefore, ℰ   ( , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠𝑏) = ℰ   
′
( , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠𝑏 ∷ 𝑛𝑖𝑙) is true, which 
yields the following judgment. 
  Judgment 2: Judgment 1  ⊢  ∀ (𝑠: 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡), ℰ   ( , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠) = ℰ   
′
( , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝒯(𝑠)). 
 Second, the original proof goal is converted as follows. 
  Goal': ∀ (𝑠 𝑠2: 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡), ℰ   ( , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑆𝑒𝑞(𝑠2, 𝑠)) = ℰ   
′
( , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝒯(𝑆𝑒𝑞(𝑠2, 𝑠))). 
We simplify Goal' according to the definition of 𝒯  as ∀ (𝑠 𝑠2: 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡), ℰ   ( , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑆𝑒𝑞(𝑠2, 𝑠)) = ℰ   
′
( , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠2 ∷ 𝑠). For 
the left side of Goal', 𝑠2 ≠ 𝑆𝑒𝑞(∗) according to Judgment 1. Therefore, the left side can be evaluated according to the rule EVAL-STT-SEQ1 as 
follows. 
ℰ   (ℰ   ( , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠2), 𝑒𝑛𝑣′, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠) (H1) 
Similarly, we can follow the process defined in the rule EVAL-STT-SEQ2 to evaluate the right side of Goal' as follows. 
ℰ   
′
(ℰ   
′
( , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠2 ∷ 𝑛𝑖𝑙), 𝑒𝑛𝑣
′, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠) (H2) 
According to Judgment 2, 𝑠 can be specified as 𝑠2. Hence, H1: ℰ   ( , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠2) = ℰ   
′
( , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠2 ∷ 𝑛𝑖𝑙). If the output state of 
H1  is an error, ℰ   (ℰ   ( , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠2), 𝑒𝑛𝑣′, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠) = ℰ   
′
(ℰ   
′
( , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠2 ∷ 𝑛𝑖𝑙), 𝑒𝑛𝑣
′, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠) = 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 . Otherwise, H1 
can be assigned as  ′. Hence, the left side of Goal' is ℰ   ( ′, 𝑒𝑛𝑣′, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠) and the right side is ℰ   
′
( ′, 𝑒𝑛𝑣′, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠). 
Furthermore, 𝑠′ can be specified as 𝑠 according to Judgment 2. Therefore, ℰ   
′
( ′, 𝑒𝑛𝑣′, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠) = ℰ   ( ′, 𝑒𝑛𝑣′, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠). Hence, 
we successfully prove the Theorem Sequence Equivalence. 
Because the old semantics are equivalent with the new semantics, and the new semantics also satisfy the Axiom Pointer Counter, the new 
evaluation algorithm for ℱℐ can be redefined according to that given in Table 8 based on the rules NEW-STT-SEQ1 and NEW-STT-SEQ2. 
Because the semantics of all other statement types are not modified, the ⇓𝑃(𝐹𝑅𝑊 𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟 𝑚) process still represents the process of evaluation. 
First and foremost, this modification solves the CBNT problem. This is illustrated in Table 8 by the fact that the evaluation unit at each step 
is a single statement rather than the entire FRWprogram. The list datatype is an individual polymorphic recursive type, so the list datatype can 
take the statement datatype as its parameter and be specified as a 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 {𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡} datatype whose list elements are values with the statement 
datatype. If an FRWprogram is a statement list, the head of FRWprogram is the next executed statement, and it can be evaluated by ⇓𝑃( ) 
directly in 𝛤 , rather than first employing ⇓𝑃( ) to evaluate sequence statement semantics. Therefore, the version of ℱℐ employing the new 
evaluation algorithm will not be employed again to evaluate 𝑠0, and this process will also not be bounded by λ-abstraction due to the let 
expression. Thus, as illustrated in Table 9, the actual evaluation order is the same as the expected order, which takes a statement as an evaluation 
unit. Therefore, the specification 𝑛𝑢 (𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 )  in formula (18) is simplified to the specification 𝑛𝑢 (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡) , where 
𝑛𝑢 (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡) can be viewed as the special case of 𝑛𝑢 (𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ) for an FRWprogram with only a single statement. As such, 
𝑛𝑢 (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡) = 1. Hence, the new 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑧  is optimized as follows. 
Table 8. New algorithm defining evaluation in the revised ℱℐ (i.e., ℱℐ′) 
Algorithm ℱℐ′_enter_point 
Function: Fixpoint ℱℐ′ 
Input: Initial K steps, optional initial memory state 𝑜      , current environment env, super environment fenv, initial 
arguments 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠, and valid 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ′. 
Output: Final memory state signed with optional type. 
𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟎: if 𝑒𝑛𝑣 ℎ  𝑘(𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣) = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, then go to 𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟏, else throw out program; 
𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟏: if 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 = 𝑠0 ∷ 𝑠1, then 𝑒𝑛𝑣
′ = 𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑣(𝑠0 ∷ 𝑠1, 𝑒𝑛𝑣) and go to 𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟐, else ⟦      ⟧; 
𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟐: if ( , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝜀0) ⇓𝑃( 0)
 𝑖 𝑙𝑑 
→    ⟦      
′
⟧, then go to 𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟑, else throw out program; 
𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟑: ℱℐ′ (⟦      
′
⟧ , 𝑒𝑛𝑣′, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠, 𝑠1). 
Table 9. Abstract evaluation process of an FRWprogram in the revised ℱℐ (i.e., ℱℐ′) 
ℱℐ′(⟦      ⟧, 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 𝑠,∗) 
  𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑑
⇒    ℱℐ′(⟦      ⟧, 𝑠0 ∷ 𝑠1 ∷ ⋯ ∷ 𝑛𝑖𝑙,∗) 
 𝑏 
⇒ 𝛽𝜄𝜎 ℱℐ′ ((𝑒𝑛𝑣. 𝐾, ⟦      ⟧, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝜀0) ⇓𝑃( 0), 𝑠1 ∷ ⋯ ∷ 𝑛𝑖𝑙,∗) 
 𝑏 






⇒ 𝛽𝜄𝜎 ⟦       ⟧ 
 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑧  
≡ (𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡) ∗ 𝑛𝑢 (ℱℐ)) + 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ) 




]) ∗ 𝑐  𝑏𝑖−1!
 
𝑖=0
)) + 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ) 




]) ∗ 𝑐  𝑏𝑖−1!
 
𝑖=0
) + 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ) 
(19) 
Here, we note that the component 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(ℱℐ) corresponding to the first term on the right will not be recursively called, and the time complexity 
for evaluating a sequence statement is reduced as 𝑂(1).  
Second, the new definition not only reduces 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑧 , but it also strengthens the typing judgment of sequence statements. This can be 
explained as follows. In contrast to the original definition, the new definitions NEW-STT-SEQ1 and NEW-STT-SEQ2 are not essential for 
defining the side condition ∀ 𝑠: 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑡, 𝑖𝑓 𝑠 = 𝑆𝑒𝑞(𝑠0, 𝑠1) 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑠0 ≠ 𝑆𝑒𝑞 (𝑠, 𝑠
′)  because the Seq constructor is removed from the 
statement type in the new statement, and the constructor is a typing parameter of list type, where, according to the list type [30], the connection 
constructor is 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 {𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡} ∷ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡. Therefore, if the first parameter is not a statement type, 
the list typing judgment aids the type-checking mechanism in the trusted core of proof assistants to locate errors, such that the side condition 
need not be defined in the new sequence statement typing judgment. 
Of course, Solution 1 is also a generic solution for the CBNT problem in different situations. It should also be noted that, while defining 
pattern matching for each parameter explicitly may seem to be another available solution, this scheme will actually make the problem more 
serious. This can be illustrated by the abstract recursive datatype given in Figure 6. Here, the number of parameters is arbitrary, and, if the 
number of parameters is 𝑛, the function must define pattern matching explicitly for 𝑛 − 1 parameters in the function body. However, the 
pattern matching for each parameter is identical to the pattern matching results of all other parameters. Therefore, the new size of ℱℐ can be 
expressed as 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒  𝑤(ℱℐ) ≡ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(ℱℐ) ∗ 𝑛, which correspondingly increases 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑧 , and makes this solution counterproductive. 
Finally, the abstract recursive datatype given in Figure 6 can further illustrate how our proposed solution of defining a new higher level 
connection datatype is one of the best solutions for the CBNT problem. As mentioned in the discussion of Problem 1, the feature of functional 
programming provided by higher-order theorem proving assistants requires that the base parameters in the constructor 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖: [[𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖] 𝜏?̅?] →
𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 → [… ] → 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 be evaluated in the current context; otherwise, the information will be lost. However, the 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 {𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡}datatype 
solves this problem by replacing 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 in datatype 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡. Moreover, the term 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖   𝑖𝑑0 𝑖𝑑1 𝑖𝑑2… 𝑖𝑑𝑠 obtained after replacement can be 
equivalently redefined as the term 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 (𝑖𝑑0 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 (𝑖𝑑1 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 (𝑖𝑑2…𝑛𝑖𝑙))) ⨁ 𝑖𝑑𝑠,, where the symbol ⨁ represents combination.. As such, we 
need only evaluate the head of the 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 {𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡} in the current recursion period, and the remaining base parameters can be completely 
transmitted to the next recursion period within the list. Although this increases the number of recursion periods, it solves Problem 1 completely, 
and the correctness of the translation can be easily proven by defining a lemma like Translation. 
Solution 2 (Information redundancy explosion) While CBNT is solved by Solution 1, the 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(ℱℐ) component given in formula (19) 
remains very large, and this will import an excessive volume of logic information in 𝛤 , resulting in IRE. 
Under ideal conditions, only necessary information would be included in 𝛤 , and the pattern matching results in 𝛤  could be simplified 
directly, rather than being held in 𝛤 . This would eliminate the factorial term in (19), and thereby maintain a manageable volume of information 
in 𝛤 . These ideal conditions can be achieved through prioritization, and the best prioritization scheme to achieve this end is dynamic 
programming based on the call-by-name evaluation strategy. This is an interesting finding, in that, although CBNT is caused by the evaluation 
order of the call-by-name strategy used by tactics in higher-order theorem proving assistants, this strategy can be used to solve the IRE problem. 
According to this strategy, the bodies of all definitions, including functions and values, are stored in their own contexts, and are not evaluated 
until they are needed in 𝛤 . Therefore, this feature can be taken advantage of to hide information not required for use in 𝛤 . 
The specific process for achieving this end is illustrated in Figure 11, where the surface context 𝛤, which is usually 𝛤 , consists only of 
basic expressions 𝜀 whose results can be matched in the matching guard directly. The matching results, their sub-matching results, functions, 
and special values, such as memory states and addresses, are separately encapsulated into definitions. In particular, the super-matching results 
must be separated from the sub-matching results. For example, if 𝒹𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is a matching result, its sub-matching result should be separately 
defined in 𝒹𝑙. In this way, an optimal evaluation process for ℱℐ can be obtained based on dynamic programming by breaking the process into 















Because of the particular feature associated with the call-by-name evaluation strategy, the process 𝛤′ ⊳ 𝒟 (𝒹𝑖 , 𝒹𝑗 , … , 𝛤′′ ⊳ 𝒟(𝒹𝑚, 𝒹 , … )) 
in formula (20) is not applied until all 𝜀 in 𝛤 have been eliminated completely.  
 
Figure 11. Deeply embedded structure for large functions 
In addition, we also note that Solution 2 improves the level of reusability because general definitions, such as address mapping, can be 
reused by other definitions rather than being redefined. The rules for building definitions can be summarized by the following Principle. 
Principle (Classification) A pattern matching result should not contain any explicit sub-matching results, and any top-level structure terms 
should not be transformed as parameters in function calls. 
Following Classification, the basic expressions 𝑒 are separately classified into different contexts, and the matching results 𝑐  𝑏𝑖 and 
𝑐 𝑜  𝑏𝑖 and other complex terms 𝑟𝑖 are separately encapsulated into definitions in different contexts. The effect of this process on 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(ℱℐ) is 
illustrated as follows. 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝜀context 𝛤
𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗
𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
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𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠











⇒ ([𝑒𝛤0⨁𝑑𝛤0] ↶𝛤0⊲𝛤1 ([𝑒𝛤1⨁ 𝑑𝛤1] ↶𝛤1⊲𝛤2 (… ([𝑒𝛤𝑖  ⨁ 𝑑𝛤𝑖] ↶𝛤𝑖⊲𝛤𝑖+1 (… ))))) 
⇒ ([𝑒𝛤0⨁𝑑𝛤0] ↶𝛤0⊲𝛤𝑑 ̅̅ ̅̅ ) (21) 
  
Here, we assign 𝑒𝛤𝑖 as the set of basic expressions in the context 𝛤𝑖, and assign 𝑑𝛤𝑖 as the set of all bound names of definitions, which are the 
entry points of the respective definition bodies. In addition, according to Classification, the sub-matching results are defined separately from the 
super-matching results, and the top-level structure terms are forbidden from being transformed into the sub-definition interface. Therefore, 
𝑐 𝑜  𝑏𝑖 and 𝑐  𝑏𝑖 are eliminated from formula (21), and 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(ℱℐ) is further simplified using 𝛤?̅?, which represents the set of deep contexts.
  
According to the call-by-name evaluation strategy, definitions 𝑑𝛤 do not occupy the computing resource. Moreover, the body of the 
definitions 𝑑𝛤𝑖, which is defined in the ↶𝛤𝑖⊲𝛤𝑑 ̅̅ ̅̅  process, will not be unfolded until either 𝑒𝛤𝑖 is eliminated as the normal form or the definitions 
in 𝑑𝛤𝑖 are necessary. This is defined as follows. 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝛤 ≡ 𝑒𝛤⨁𝑑𝛤⨁𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡) (22) 
In this way, only the basic expressions 𝑒𝛤𝑖, the definition entry points 𝑑𝛤𝑖 in context 𝛤𝑖, and the bodies of the definitions in 𝑑𝛤𝑖 will be hidden 
in deeper contexts, and the trusted core of proof assistants needs only to evaluate 𝑒𝛤𝑖. Accordingly, the value of 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑧  for 𝛤  can be 
simplified as follows. 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑧 ≡ 𝑒𝑠𝛤 + 𝑑𝑠𝛤 + 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡) (23) 
Although this process will increase the number of times the unfold operation must be conducted, the influence of this increase on the 
computational efficiency of ℱℐ is negligible because the unfold operation is one of the simplest atomic operations. Therefore, the computational 
load of the unfold operation in 𝛤  on the computing resource is much less than the original evaluation process. In addition, the number of times 
the unfold operation must be conducted is less than or equal to the number of definitions 𝑑𝛤 in 𝛤 , and the number of 𝑒𝛤⨁𝑑𝛤 operations in 𝛤  
for any ℱℐ is practically fixed at a constant value. Thus, the value of 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑧  for 𝛤  is influenced only by the complexity of a single 
statement, which is denoted by 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡). Moreover, the requirement that 𝑒𝛤 be simplified as the normal form eliminates irrelevant 
logic expressions from the computational load. Therefore, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑧  is significantly reduced, such that the computational load of the trusted core 
remains within a manageable range. Thus, the IRE problem is solved. 
Solution 3 (Concurrent reduction) Finally, the cause of CR can be easily solved by defining different pump limitations for every layer, as 
shown in Figure 12. Here, we modify the K-limitation structure adopted in each layer, respectively, which solves the CR problem completely. 
 
Figure 12. New K-limitation structure for FEther to alleviate the CR problem 
5.2 Case Study 
We applied the three proposed optimization schemes in the development process of a new version of FEther for FSPVM-E, and employed 
FSPVM-E to execute (i.e., verify) the very simple code segment in Example 1. Compared with the result given in Figure 3 for the non-optimized 
version of FEther, the results in Figure 13 indicate that the execution time decreased from 92.546 s to 0.033 s for the optimized version of FEther. 
As such, the optimized version requires just 3/10000 of the time required by the non-optimized version. The details regarding this new version of 
FEther will be introduced in a subsequent technological report. 
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 Figure 13. Simple example for testing the execution efficiency of FEther after optimization 
In addition, we also tested the optimized version of FEther under an identical experimental environment and with an equivalent data set as 
those employed for the results obtained in Figure 4 by the non-optimized version of FEther. As shown in Figure 14, the purple line is the peak 
execution times of FRWprograms constructed using specific instructions, and the red line is the peak execution times of FRWprograms 
constructed using abstract instructions. Compared with the results in Figure 4, we note that both program types exhibit a linear increase in 
execution time with respect to an increasing number of lines, rather than exponentially, as was obtained using the non-optimized version of 
FEther. 
These experimental results verify that the optimization schemes provide results that conform with our analyses of the causes of CBNT, IRE, 
and CR. Moreover, the experiments certify that these schemes can optimize FEther, and improve the execution efficiency of the proposed 
FSPVM-E significantly. 
 
Figure 14. Maximum evaluation times of FEther after optimization for example smart contracts given in [4] 
6. Conclusions and future work 
In this paper, we presented analyses of the issues denoted as call-by-name termination, information redundancy explosion, and concurrent 
reduction that reduce the evaluation efficiency of formal interpreters adopted in an FSPVM framework and other large programs developed in 
higher-order theorem proving assistants. We then built abstract models based on these analyses, and developed respective optimization schemes 
for each issue. Finally, we applied the proposed schemes to optimize the FEther interpreter employed in FSPVM-E. Experimental results verified 
that the execution efficiency of FEther was improved significantly. We are presently pursuing the optimization and certification of FSPVM-E. 
Then, we will extend FSPVM-E to support the formal verification of smart contracts on the EOS blockchain platform, which includes the 
formalization of a subset of the C++ language and the respective interpreter based on the GERM framework. 
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